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1  Introduction 
The chemical sector is a vital part of the U.S. economy; it makes up approximately 1.9 per cent 
of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and it is the nation’s greatest exporter (Spellman and 
Bieber, 2009). In addition, the chemical sector contributes to the products of many other sectors 
of the economy including the manufacturing of automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural 
products, amongst others. According to KPMG (2010), the U.S. chemical industry directly 
employs 800,000 people and is responsible for another 5.5 million jobs that are supported 
indirectly through related activities. As an important player in the U.S. economy, the chemical 
industry is also considered one of the critical infrastructures, as stated in the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) (2009). Critical infrastructure, more specifically, is any 
material asset that is essential to the operations of an economy and government (Spellman and 
Bieber, 2009). Critical infrastructure thus span many sectors, including agriculture, banking and 
finance, chemical materials, transportation, etc. What distinguishes the chemical industry from 
some of the other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States is that it is considered 
vulnerable, i.e. it can be exploited to cause harm to society and the system in general (Lippin et 
al, 2006; Spellman and Bieber, 2009). 
To make matters worse, the vulnerabilities of U.S. chemical sector are exacerbated by the 
close proximity of some chemical facilities to highly populated areas. For example, a study 
conducted by the Center for American Progress notes that “More than 80 million Americans live 
within range of a catastrophic chemical release from at least one of the 101 most hazardous 
chemical facilities” (Orum, 2008 p 3). Perhaps, as a result of these vulnerabilities, terrorists are 
interested in attacking this sector (Department of Justice (DOJ), 2000). Terrorists may either 
attack a chemical facility directly with the goal of causing destruction to the facility and 
 
 
surrounding communities or with the goal of stealing chemicals that would be used to carry out 
attacks elsewhere (Stephenson, 2005; Schierow, 2006). In recognition of the possibility of 
chemical attacks against the chemical sector, the federal government has taken some steps to 
reduce the risk of chemical terrorism (Spellman and Bieber, 2009) by creating planning 
scenarios and passing some regulations. For example, four of the fifteen National Planning 
Scenarios are related to chemical attacks (Howe, 2004). Regulations to prevent terrorist attacks 
on U.S. chemical facilities include, but are not limited to, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards (CFATS). While CFATS is a good idea conceptually, its implementation is fraught 
with many problems according to an internal review done by Infrastructure Security Compliance 
Division (ISCD) (Sadiq and McCreight, 2013). One perturbing problem which Congress, the 
chemical industry, industry trade associations, etc., agree on is the slow pace of CFATS 
implementation (Sadiq, forthcoming). Since 2007, ISCD has assigned 3,468 facilities to their 
final tier designations and of these, only 40 have had their plans approved (Beers and Wulf, 
2013). Against the backdrop of slow implementation, communities cannot afford to wait for 
CFATS to ramp up before taking protective action because terrorists might see this security lapse 
as an opportunity to strike. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 are vivid reminders that terrorists are 
capable of exploiting vulnerabilities.  This is not to suggest that terrorist attacks pose a greater 
risk to chemical facilities than other types of hazards.  As a matter of fact, accidents and natural 
hazards, for instance, tend to occur more frequently and result in a greater number of fatalities 
than terrorist attacks (Viscusi, 2009).  In 2012, for example, the Center for Effective Government 
(2013), reported 1,133 deaths from toxic chemical spills and other accidents.  Nonetheless, this 
 
 
paper focuses on the threat posed by terrorism and the interim final rule
1
 known as CFATS, 
which was designed to protect American citizens.  
In this paper, we seek to answer two questions. (1) How can DHS speed up CFATS 
implementation? (2) In the face of slow CFATS implementation, what should communities that 
have hazardous chemical facilities do in the meantime? To answer these questions, we begin by 
giving a background on CFATS, including an update on CFATS. Then we describe the problems 
we are addressing in this paper; namely that CFATS is slow.  Next we examine past and foiled 
chemical terrorism incidents in the U.S. and chemical facility vulnerabilities.  This is followed 
by a discussion on the need for collaboration. Finally, we present our recommendations, 
conclude with limitations, and outline a future research agenda for the critical infrastructure, 
homeland security and emergency management communities.  
2  Background on CFATS  
Despite the fact that several members of Congress expressed concern over the security of 
chemical facilities and hazardous chemicals, it was not until after the tragic events of 9/11 that 
Congress began taking actions to address these concerns. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
chemical security was practised on a voluntary basis by the chemical sector, with some 
organisations like the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates (SOCMA) making 
security a priority for their members (Allmond, 2012). Chemical facilities pose a hazard to 
homeland security due to the large quantities of chemicals that they store and the potential for 
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 An interim Final Rule, according to the National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, is “a rule promulgated by an 
administrative agency that goes into effect when it is published, but will be open for public comment for a specific 
period of time and then potentially revised and issued as a final rule.”  Accessed 
http://sustainableagriculture.net/publications/grassrootsguide/glossary/.     
 
 
 
release, theft or diversion, and sabotage and contamination of chemicals by terrorists (Shea, 
2012). In response to 9/11 and the concomitant increasing concerns over chemical sector 
security, Congress gave the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the authority to regulate 
the security of chemical facilities. In April of 2007, DHS passed the interim final rule called 
CFATS and gave the ISCD the authority to oversee the programme (Shea, 2012). Furthermore, 
in 2006, DHS incorporated the chemical sector into the NIPP, which is designed to enhance 
critical infrastructure safety in the U.S. 
 
(NIPP, 2013).  
Under the interim final rule, 322 chemicals were designated as “chemicals of interest” 
(COI). Facilities that hold significant amounts of COI were asked to submit information to DHS, 
after which DHS determined preliminary risk levels of the facilities. Risk levels range from tier 1 
(the highest risk level) to tier 4 (the lowest risk level) (Shea, 2012). Once facilities are designated 
into tiers, they are asked to submit a Site Security Plan (SSP) or an Alternative Security Plan 
(ASP). DHS can either approve or reject the submitted SSPs or ASPs. A facility is considered 
compliant if DHS approved its SSP or ASP and the facility implements the approved SSP or 
ASP (Beers, 2012).   
In November of 2011, an internal document prepared by the Director of ISCD that 
brought attention to some inherent problems of CFATS was leaked to the public. In this 
document, it was revealed that ISCD had high turnover in management, low employee morale, 
issues with compliance inspections, and a lack of support from the Office of Infrastructure 
Protection (IP) and the National Program and Protection Directorate (NPPD) (Beers, 2012), 
amongst other problems. As a result of these issues, none of the approximately 4000 SSPs that 
were submitted had been approved by DHS. In response to these problems and the need to 
 
 
address them, DHS developed a 94-item action plan to improve and track its progress (Caldwell, 
2012).    
In September of 2012, Suzanne Spaulding, the Deputy Under Secretary of NPPD, and 
David Wulf, Director of NPPD, reported that 68 out of the 94 action items were completed 
(Spaulding and Wulf, 2012). Furthermore, in March of 2013, it was reported that ISCD had 
approved 36 tier 1 SSPs and ASPs and four tier 2 SSPs and ASPs (Beers and Wulf, 2013). 
Despite these improvements, GAO estimates that it will take ISCD another 7 to 9 years to 
complete tier assignments and review the remaining 3,120 site security plans (Caldwell, 2013).  
Shea 
 
(2012) has drawn attention to another CFATS problem that is relevant to this paper 
– the Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) System. CVI is information that is 
exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and other similar laws 
(Waugh and Streib, 2006), including the “Emergency Planning Community Right to Know Act” 
(EPCRA) (Shea, 2012). According to DHS (2008b), both the Security Vulnerability Assessments 
(SVAs) and the SSPs are considered CVI.  This means that only authorised individuals have 
access to this information.  An authorised individual is “any person who has completed DHS on-
line CVI training, which includes obtaining an Authorized User number, or equivalent measures 
approved by DHS; and complied with any background checks or other requirements for personal 
identification or trustworthiness that DHS may require under 6 CFR §§ 27.400(e)(2)(iii), and 
27.400(e)(3)” (DHS, 2008).  One issue that arises from CVI is that unauthorised emergency 
managers will lack important information on the vulnerability of chemical facilities in their 
communities. This information, which local emergency managers cannot obtain through EPCRA 
or FOIA, is necessary to properly plan for potential chemical disasters.  For example, if a 
 
 
chemical disaster were to occur, a lack of access to the SSPs may result in duplication of efforts 
and consequently, a slow response time.  
3  Chemical Terrorism and Chemical Facility Vulnerabilities  
In this section, past and foiled terrorist attacks involving the use of chemicals in the U.S. is  
discussed using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), and The Heritage Foundation. We 
also discuss the exacerbation of U.S. vulnerability resulting from the location of chemical 
companies near the 10 largest U.S. cities using data from the U.S. Census Bureau and 
Greenpeace USA.  
Table 1 illustrates the number of chemical attacks that have already occurred in the 
United States between 1970 and 2011. From this table, it is clear that chemical attacks do occur 
in the U.S. and thus are a real threat to its citizens and critical infrastructures. According to 
START (2012), there were a total of 1 fatality and 40 injuries sustained by victims of these 
twelve chemical attacks. While the number of casualties to date appears to be small, there is a 
possibility that a successful terrorist attack on a large chemical facility could lead to fatalities, 
destruction, or disruption on a massive scale. For example, according to the National Planning 
Scenario 6 (Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals) (a hypothetical scenario), if terrorists 
use toxic industrial chemicals to attack a community, the chemical release can lead to 350 
fatalities, 1,000 hospitalisations, contamination of the environment, and billions of dollars in 
economic loss (Howe, 2012).  In addition to this, table 2 demonstrates that there have been 
several attempts by terrorists to carry out attacks using chemicals since 9/11.  Although, these 
four plots were foiled, they are strong indication that the threat of chemical terrorism is real and 
ongoing.   
 
 
Table 1. Chemical Attacks in the United States: 1970-2012 
Date Location Perpetrator Target Type Weapon Type 
2/17/2010 Clearwater, 
Florida 
Unknown Business Chemical 
  4/3/2000 Kansas City, 
Missouri 
Unknown Government 
(general) 
Chemical 
3/22/2000 Ogden, Utah Unknown Government 
(general) 
Chemical 
3/26/1998 Marina Del Rey, 
California 
Individual Government 
(general) 
Chemical 
9/19/1988 Los Angeles, 
California 
Up the IRS, Inc. Government 
(general) 
Explosives/Bombs/ 
Dynamite, Chemical 
11/26/1986 New York City, 
New York 
Jewish Defense 
League (JDL) 
Business Incendiary, Chemical 
9/2/1986 New York City, 
New York 
Jewish Defense 
League (JDL) 
Business Chemical 
2/1978 Cincinnati, Ohio Anti-Abortion 
Activists 
Abortion related Explosives/Bombs/ 
Dynamite, Chemical  
9/6/1976 Hyattsville, 
Maryland 
Individual Private Citizens 
& Property 
Chemical 
1/1/1976 Unknown Arabs (suspected) Government 
(general) 
Chemical, unknown 
 
 
11/6/1973 Oakland, 
California 
Symbionese 
Liberation Army 
(SLA) 
Educational 
Institution 
Firearms, Chemical 
3/9/1970 Ashville, 
Alabama 
Ku Klux Klan Private Citizens 
& Property 
Chemical, Unknown 
 
Source: START. (2012). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Foiled Chemical Terrorist Attacks in the United States: 2001-2013 
Date Location Perpetrator Target Type Weapon Type 
8/2011 Unknown Emerson 
Winfield Begolly 
Government and 
Private Citizens 
Explosives, destructive 
devices, and weapons 
of mass destruction 
2/2011 Lubbock,   
Texas 
Khalid Ali-M 
Aldawsari 
Government and 
Private Citizens 
Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED) 
9/2009 New York City, 
New York 
Najibullah Zazi, 
Al-Qaeda 
Private Citizens TATP bomb 
3/2003 Unknown Uzair and 
Saifullah Paracha 
Unknown Explosives 
Source: The Heritage Foundation (2012) 
 
Table 3 shows the number of individuals that could potentially be impacted by high risk 
chemical plants located near the 10 largest U.S. cities by population, according to the United 
States Census Bureau and Greenpeace USA. A major implication of Tables 1, 2 and 3 is that 
chemical weapons have been used or attempted to be used in terrorist attacks in the U.S. and may 
be used again in the future, especially considering the fact that scores of U.S. chemical facilities 
are located close to large populations. A successful terrorist attack on a large chemical facility 
located close to an urban centre would no doubt result in mass casualties and injuries, in addition 
to considerable damage to infrastructure. As a result of the potential consequence of such an 
attack, the federal government, the chemical industry, communities, and other stakeholders 
should be aware of the risks faced by the U.S. chemical industry and take additional steps to 
safeguard this important sector.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3. The number of individuals that could potentially be impacted by high risk chemical 
plants located near the 10 most populated U.S. cities.   
City  Plant Name Vulnerable  
Population (in 
millions) 
Vulnerability 
 Zone*(in 
miles) 
New York, NY    
 Infineum USA L.P. Bayway Chemical Plant 4.0 14  
Kuehne Chemical Co., Inc 12.0 14 
 Bayonne Plant Holding L.L.C 0.11 2.13 
Los Angeles, CA    
 Silver Lake Chlorination Station 0.41  3 
AMVAC Chemical Corporation 3.44 9.9 
 JCI Jones Chemical Inc.—Torrance 4.54 16  
 KIK SoCal Inc. 4.9  14  
 Pioneer Americas LLCd/b/a Olin Chlor 
Alkali Produc 
2.55 9.9 
Chicago, IL    
 Tyson Foods Inc 0.11 1.7 
 Pelron 1.65 8.7 
Dover Chemical Corporation 1.88 14  
 Kemira Water Solutions, Inc 1.49 14  
 PVS Chemicals Incorporated 5.07 25  
 Airgas Specialty Products, INC 0.30 4.4 
 Arkema Emulsion Systems 0.39 .9  
 Rowell Chemical Corporation 2.0  14 
 K.A. Steel Chemicals, Inc 1.41 14 
 CITGO Petroleum Corporation 3.1 22 
 Stepan Company 1.5 25 
Houston, TX    
 KIK International LLC 2.13 14 
Akzo Nobel Chemicals Inc. 1.1 12 
 Champion Technologies, Inc .66 12 
 
 The Clorox Company 1.87 14 
 Rhodia Inc. 3.45 25 
 South Houston Wastewater Treatment Plant 0.14 3.1 
 Terra Mississippi Nitrogen, Inc 2.4  25  
 Pasadena Refining Systems, Inc 0.65 9.3 
 East Water Purification Plant 1.4 14  
 Agrifos Fertilizer L.L.C. 3.15 25  
 Ethyl Corporation 1.24 14  
 Arkema Inc. 2.0  16  
 ALTIVIA Greens Bayou 3.4  14  
 Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc 1.19 14  
 DXI Industries, Inc 1.41 16  
 Stolt-Nielsen USA Inc. 0.40 8.7 
 Occidental Petroleum Corporation 2.6 25  
 Delta Petroleum Company 3.6 22  
 GEO Specialty Chemicals, Inc 0.86 15  
 
 
*“The size of this zone varies for each facility and ranges from less than a mile to 25 miles. Each zone was 
determined by the plant owner based on the type and quantity of the toxic chemical on site, local topography and 
weather patterns.”2  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Greenpeace USA 
                                                          
2
 http://usactions.greenpeace.org/chemicals/map/. 
 Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc 1.83 22  
 Momentive Specialty Chemicals Inc 0.20 6.8 
 DuPont 1.6 25  
 INVISTA S.a.r.l 1.89 25  
 Baker Hughes, Inc 1.12 25  
 Kaneka Corporation 2.77 25  
 Lyondell Chemical Company 1.15 18  
 Celanese, Ltd. 1.4 21  
Philadelphia, PA    
 Sunoco, Inc 1.31 8.04 
Tanner Industries, Inc 0.35 3.7  
 Solvay Solexis, Inc 4.17 25  
 PBF Holding Company LLC 3.17 19  
 ConocoPhillips 2.4 19  
 Honeywell International Inc. 3.64 25  
 E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., Inc 2.0 25  
Phoenix, AZ    
 Hill Brothers Chemical Co. 1.75 14  
DPC Enterprises, L.P. 1.69 14  
San Antonio, TX    
 H.E. Butt Grocery Company 0.18 4.8 
San Diego, CA    
 City of San Diego Water Department 0.11 2.4 
Dallas, TX    
 NTMWD Regional Water Treatment Plant 2.1 25  
Dallas Water Utilities 2.5 25  
 Trinity River Authority of Texas 0.36 14  
 Dallas Water Utilities 0.63 19  
 Central Wastewater Treatment Plant 1.6 14  
 North Texas Municipal Water District 0.15 3  
 Elm Fork Water Treatment Plant 1.6 14 
 Petra Chemical Company 2.3 14 
 Bachman Water Treatment Plant 2.0 14 
 Trinity River Authority of Texas 3.93 25 
 Tyson Foods Inc 0.13 3.6 
 Pierce Chemicals/Royal Bond 0.32 5.72 
 Southside WWTP 0.63 19  
 Tarrant County Water Supply Project 1.3 13.5 
 Village Creek Wastewater Treatment Plant 2.6 21  
San Jose, CA    
 Air Products and Chemical, Inc 0.21 3.8  
San Jose/Santa Clara Water Pollution 
Control Plant 
0.22 5.5  
 
 
4  Need for Enhanced Collaboration 
In this section, we discuss the need for collaboration in critical infrastructure, homeland security 
and emergency management in general and chemical security and CFATS in particular. 
According to a working group that consisted of emergency management practitioners and 
academics, collaboration involves establishing and maintaining “broad and sincere relationships 
among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmosphere, build 
consensus, and facilitate communication” (Blanchard et al, 2007). Collaboration amongst 
homeland security and emergency management actors provides a solid foundation for mitigating, 
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural and man-made disasters (Waugh and 
Streib, 2006). In this paper, collaboration is the “mutual agreement to work together on the same 
task” (Kapucu and Garayev, 2011), whereby the results of the group working together are better 
than any one member would have accomplished alone.   
There is no denying the fact that the federal government is interested in protecting critical 
infrastructures through public-private partnerships. For instance, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator Craig Fugate (2011) said, “We cannot separate out 
and segment one sector in isolation; the interdependencies are too great.… We want the private 
sector to be part of the team and we want to be in the situation where we work as a team and not 
compete with each other”. DHS Secretary, Janet Napolitano concurs with Craig Fugate by noting 
that “programs such as the “If You See Something, Say Something™” public awareness 
campaign and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting initiative highlight the importance 
of public-private partnerships in reporting suspicious activity to local law enforcement and 
underscore that security is a shared responsibility” (DHS, 2011). Public-private partnerships are 
defined as commitments by governments and private businesses to work together to achieve 
 
 
shared objectives for the delivery of public services and infrastructure (World Bank, 2013). The 
quest for such an important partnership is laudable and if properly done, would be instrumental 
in safeguarding the U.S. critical infrastructure and establishing an efficient and effective 
homeland security and emergency management system. There have been some recent efforts by 
government agencies to build public-private partnerships.  FEMA, for example, has made 
available a public forum where communities can share their collaborative efforts as models for 
disaster resilience (FEMA, 2012). Despite such efforts to establish collaboration, it is unclear 
how to establish collaborative ventures between government and the private sector in practise 
and there are no organisational guidelines for ensuring public-private collaborations (Abou-Bakr, 
2013) even though the private sector owns about 85 per cent of the U.S. infrastructure (9/11 
Commission Report, 2004).   
In the context of chemical security, it is noteworthy that DHS has and is trying to 
collaborate with industry on some chemical security initiatives. For example, in 2010, DHS 
launched “CFATS-Share”, a web-based information sharing tool that “provides interested state 
Homeland Security Advisors and their designees, DHS Protective Security Advisors, the 
National Infrastructure Coordinating Center, the Chemical Sector-Specific Agency, as well as 
members of the State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council access to 
key details on CFATS facility information as needed” (Beers, 2011). While such collaborative 
programmes are encouraged, DHS needs to establish specific guidelines on what roles the private 
sector should play in chemical security in general and CFATS in particular.  It may also be 
beneficial for DHS to turn to other agencies such as the Center for Disease Control and 
 
 
Prevention (CDC) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for guidance on how to build 
public-private partnerships.
3
 
All disasters are local (Dynes et al, 1972) and so communities must build their capacity to 
respond to chemical disasters within their borders because if a chemical release were to occur, 
the federal government may not be able to marshal its resources for hours or even days (Waugh 
and Streib, 2006). The National Response Framework (NRF) makes this point very clear by 
noting that, “Each organization or level of government therefore has an imperative to fund and 
execute its own core emergency management responsibilities” (DHS, 2008a).  
Due to a lack of financial resources, local governments are not able to invest adequately 
in emergency management programmes. Nonetheless, the repercussions of not taking action to 
protect citizens from a potential chemical release can be enormous in the form of fatalities, 
injuries, and environmental degradation. Against this backdrop of insufficient resources at the 
local level, it is crucial for the local emergency management offices to collaborate with chemical 
facility owners, local public health departments, and first responders to build the capacity (e.g., 
through mutual aid agreements and joint exercises) necessary to prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from future chemical disasters (Waugh and Straub, 2006). 
5  Recommendations 
5.1  Recommendations for Speeding up CFATS 
If DHS and the chemical industry are able to establish a successful collaborative relationship, 
they stand to benefit immensely. First, collaboration can lead to trust between DHS and the 
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 See http://www.cdcfoundation.org/content/public-private-partnership-policies-and-guidelines and 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/grants/how.htm.  
 
 
 
chemical industry (Blanchard et al, 2007) and trust might in turn lead to more transparency from 
DHS and more compliance from chemical facilities. Second, with collaboration, it may be 
relatively easier for DHS and chemical facilities to work hand-in-hand to achieve an effective 
response to chemical disasters (Waugh and Sadiq, 2011; Waugh and Streib, 2006). And finally, 
collaboration can lead to better coordination of personnel and resources when responding to and 
recovering from chemical disasters.  
Two specific areas where collaboration between DHS and the chemical industry might 
help to speed up CFATS implementation are as follows. The first area has to do with how the 
Risk Based Performance Standards (RBPSs) are used to assign chemical facilities to tiers. Sadiq 
and McCreight 
 
(2013) noted that one of the problems of CFATS is a lack of transparency on 
how chemical facilities are assigned tiers. On this issue, DHS needs to be transparent and also 
involve the chemical industry in the design of the RBPSs. The involvement and subsequent input 
of the chemical industry would be instrumental in developing an effective and inclusive RBPS 
methodology. When the chemical industry knows that the RBPS methodology is inclusive, they 
are likely to believe in it, abide by it, and agree with the tier assignments that result from it. This 
will invariably help to move CFATS along quicker.  
The second area where DHS and the chemical industry can improve their collaboration 
with a view to speeding up CFATS implementation is by creating a forum separately or within 
CFATS-Share where DHS and the chemical industry can share information on lessons learned 
on CFATS design and implementation. Such a repository for multiple perspectives would benefit 
both parties. Of particular importance would be the inputs from CFATS compliant facilities who 
could share information on best practices and problems they encountered during the CFATS 
process.  Furthermore, DHS can share information on the “do’s” and “don’ts” of inspections and 
 
 
basic information about facilities, without revealing identifying and sensitive information about 
facilities that have gone through the CFATS process.  In so doing, chemical facilities may be 
able to adapt the lessons and best practices to fit their specific needs and in the process, help to 
speed up CFATS.  
In order for these specific recommendations to work, we suggest that Congress include a 
mandate within CFATS that will require DHS to collaborate with the chemical industry in both 
the design of CFATS (e.g., the use of the RBPS methodology to assign chemical facilities to 
tiers) and the implementation of CFATS (e.g., during inspections). Such a mandate, which is 
currently non-existent, would allow DHS to invest in meaningful collaborative initiatives with 
the chemical industry, thus speeding up CFATS. 
5.2  Recommendations for Helping Communities to Improve Their Capacities to Deal with 
Chemical Disasters  
We recommend that communities with chemical facilities must be prepared for a potential 
terrorist attack against their chemical facilities by including provisions for planning for chemical 
emergencies within their Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans (CEMPs) or 
Emergency Operation Plans (EOPs). For instance, a provision might include the purchase of 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and breathing apparatuses. Two main obstacles face 
communities when they try to develop specific provisions for chemical emergencies within their 
CEMPs or EOPs –a lack of CVI about the chemical facilities that are located in their 
communities and a lack of funding. An important ingredient in crafting a good plan is gathering 
information about the type and quantities of toxic chemicals present in these chemical facilities, 
as well as measures in place in these facilities to deal with chemical releases. Unfortunately, such 
information is classified as CVI and is not readily available to the public. As said earlier, 
 
 
communities through their Local Emergency Planning Commissions (LEPC) cannot obtain CVI 
by invoking EPCRA under the Superfund Authorization and Reauthorization Act (SARA) (Perry 
and Lindell, 2006). Having no access to CVI has negative implications for the communities 
harbouring chemical facilities. For example, without adequate knowledge of the type and 
quantities of chemicals present in a chemical facility that is ablaze, it would be difficult for fire 
fighters to know the appropriate strategy to adopt in putting out the fire (Sadiq and McCreight, 
2013). Similarly, if chemical facilities do not divulge information about their chemicals and their 
response capabilities or response plans for chemical disasters, it will be difficult for local 
emergency managers to include measures in their CEMPs or EOPs in readiness for a potential 
chemical disaster. The authors understand the need for chemical facilities to withhold sensitive 
information from the public. However, there is a commensurate need to balance this security 
concern with capacity development for potential chemical disasters. As a result, we suggest that 
local emergency managers should obtain CVI certification and CVI training. To obtain CVI 
certification and CVI training, local emergency managers would need to seek approval from the 
DHS inspector(s) attached to the chemical facilities from which they want the CVI (DHS, 2012).  
In addition, it is important to increase communication between DHS, and in particular CFATS 
inspectors, the chemical industry, and local emergency managers. This can be achieved through 
regular meetings, webinars, or even conferences. These avenues could help to provide updates 
regarding chemical security issues and foster improved communication, trust, and collaboration 
amongst these important players. 
The other obstacle facing communities when planning for potential chemical disasters is 
a lack of funding. With dwindling funds and competition from other areas like education, health 
care, public works, etc., there is need for communities to augment their funds through 
 
 
government grants. For example, qualified communities should seek funding from the federal 
government through the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) programme. States that have 
chemical facilities that could cause catastrophic damage if attacked by terrorists may also be able 
to get funding from the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP). Furthermore, in the face of 
modicum funds, local emergency management offices can partner with local public health 
departments, non-governmental organisations, and chemical facilities to raise funds needed to 
prepare for and respond to future chemical disasters. Finally, there may be funding available 
through private ventures. Communities should seek support –financial, logistic, etc. – from 
private entities located in their communities. There is evidence that the private sector has 
provided much needed help after major disasters in the U.S. For instance, Verizon Corporation 
donated over 5,000 cell phones to emergency responders after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Wal-
Mart shipped 2,498 trailers worth of merchandise to those in need after Hurricane Katrina, and a 
number of companies, including Hess, Johnson & Johnson, Apple, and Microsoft, donated a total 
of $126.6 million for disaster relief and recovery following Superstorm Sandy (Abou-Bakr, 
2013; Simmins, 2012). The important role that the private sector played in the aftermaths of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and more recently, Superstorm Sandy is an indication 
that the private sector’s huge resources can help communities respond to and recover from 
disasters.  
We therefore, suggest that community leaders, and in particular, local emergency 
managers explore avenues whereby public-private partnerships could be leveraged to mitigate, 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters, including chemical terrorism and chemical 
accidents (e.g., the 2013 fertiliser plant explosion in West Texas).  Community leaders can take a 
 
 
cue from FEMA’s public-private partnership programmes that educate and train the private 
sector so that they are prepared when disaster strikes (see http://www.fema.gov/private-sector).  
6  Conclusion 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the U.S. chemical industry is not only vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks but that some chemical facilities are located near highly populated areas. Perhaps, it is 
due to these two factors –wholly or partially– that terrorists are interested in attacking U.S. 
chemical facilities on our homeland. The argument that such an attack may be far-fetched seems 
legitimate especially when we look at the frequency of chemical attacks relative to natural 
disasters and technological accidents in the U.S. Some might even argue that the small number 
of chemical attacks against the U.S. chemical infrastructure is as a result of the security in place 
at U.S. chemical facilities and the tireless efforts of local, state, and federal law enforcement 
officials (as was the case of the four foiled chemical attacks in Table 2).  
The realisation by Congress that there have been some terrorist attacks against chemical 
facilities on U.S. soil in the past and that the U.S. chemical sector is vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks, led to Congress passing CFATS. Unfortunately, CFATS stakeholders –Congress, 
chemical industry, public, trade association, etc. –have noted that CFATS implementation is very 
slow and the latest update on CFATS progress by DHS reports at best, a modest pace of CFATS 
implementation. The slow implementation of CFATS does not augur well for public safety, the 
safety of U.S. critical infrastructure, the U.S. economy, and national security, especially given 
that a successful attack on a large chemical facility located within a 25-mile radius of any of the 
10 most populous U.S. cities could be catastrophic.  
 
 
This paper addresses two questions. First, “how can DHS speed up CFATS 
implementation?” Second, “in the face of slow CFATS implementation, what should 
communities that have hazardous chemical facilities do in the meantime?” We argue that 
collaboration with the chemical industry on both the design and implementation of CFATS can 
help to speed up CFATS and recommend that Congress should include specific requirements 
within CFATS that would compel DHS to collaborate with the chemical industry on both the 
design and implementation of CFATS. We also recommend that communities with chemical 
facilities must be prepared for a potential terrorist attacks against their chemical facilities by 
including provisions for planning for chemical emergencies within their CEMPs or EOPs. Two 
main obstacles face communities when they try to develop special provisions for chemical 
emergencies within their CEMPs or EOPs –a lack of CVI about the chemical facilities that are 
located in their communities and a lack of funding. We recommend that local emergency 
managers get CVI certification and also collaborate with local public health departments, private 
entities, and non-profit organisations to raise funds and build the capacity needed to mitigate, 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from potential chemical disasters. 
There are several limitations to our analysis. First, our paper focuses primarily on the 
slow implementation of CFATS by DHS and thereby ignores many of the other CFATS 
problems – organisational culture, employee morale, and administrative issues– that were made 
known in the ISCD internal report that was leaked in 2011 (Beers, 2012). The consideration of 
these issues in research could help shed light on how and why the resolution of these problems 
could improve CFATS. Another limitation is that the Global Terrorism Database does not 
include information on failed attempts or provide information on terrorist attacks that may have 
occurred in 2013.  Similarly, we were only able to find information on foiled chemical terrorist 
 
 
attacks in the U.S. from Heritage Foundation from 2001 to 2013. Based on these limitations and 
the newness of CFATS, there are a myriad of questions that homeland security, emergency 
management, and critical infrastructure researchers can explore. For instance, researchers should 
examine the effectiveness of CFATS assessment tools (e.g. Chemical Security Assessment Tool) 
and the RBPSs.  In addition, researchers should examine CFATS-Share more closely to 
determine how it can be better utilised to increase collaboration between DHS and the chemical 
industry. Despite the limitations of this paper, the authors hope that this paper will help to 
stimulate discussions and spur research in the homeland security, emergency management, and 
critical infrastructure communities with the goal of speeding up CFATS and contributing to the 
safety of the chemical industry and the country as a whole.  
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